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NOTES
Congressional Exclusion of Member-Elect and the
Political Question Doctrine
On March 1, 1967, the United States House of Representatives excluded
Member-elect Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., from his seat in the 90th Con-
gress to which he had been elected in 1966.' The exclusion was based on
findings by a select committee that Mr. Powell as a member of a prior
Congress had wrongfully and willfully misappropriated public funds, had
made false reports on expenditures, and had been guilty of contumacious
conduct toward the courts of the state of New York.' Mr. Powell and
thirteen voters from his congressional district petitioned the United States
district court for declaratory, mandatory, and injunctive relief3 against the
House of Representatives4 and three of its employees. The complaint chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Mr. Powell's exclusion. The district court
dismissed the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction.! On appeal,
the court of appeals held that there was subject matter jurisdiction, but
unanimously affirmed the dismissal.7 In November 1968, the Supreme
Court granted the petition for certiorari.' Subsequently, the 90th Congress
officially terminated and Mr. Powell, having won re-election, was seated as
a member of the 91st Congress. Held, reversed: Whether the United States
House of Representatives may constitutionally exclude a member-elect is
a justiciable question. Powell v. McCormack, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969).
I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Article III of the United States Constitution confers upon the federal
courts power to decide cases or controversies arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States.9 To be a case or controversy, and
thus justiciable, the dispute must be of a legal nature"0 and lend itself to
'House Resolution 278 provides: "'Resolved, That said Adam Clayton Powell, Member-elect
from the 18th District of the State of New York, be and the same hereby is excluded from mem-
bership in the 90th Congress and that the Speaker shall notify the Governor of the State of New
York of the existing vacancy.'" H.R. REs. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 1942
(1967).
2 113 CONG. REC. 1918-19 (1967). Contumacious conduct is the refusal of an individual to
appear before a court after having been duly cited or to obey a lawful order when he is before
the court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (4th ed. 1951).
a Powell sought to enjoin: the defendants from executing House Resolution 278; the Speaker
of the House from refusing to administer the oath to Powell; the Clerk from refusing to perform
the duties due a Representative; the Sergeant-at-Arms from refusing to pay Powell; and the Door-
keeper from refusing to admit Powell to the Chamber.
' Five members of the House were named individually and as representatives of a class of
citizens who are presently serving as Members of the House of Representatives. John W. Mc-
Cormack was named in his official capacity as Speaker of the House. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.
Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967).
' These include the Sergeant-at-Arms, the Doorkeeper, and the Clerk.
'Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967).
7 Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Two of the three court of appeals
judges held that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.
8Powell v. McCormack, 393 U.S. 949 (1968).
' U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
'
0 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937);
Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911); Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remedy: Justiciability, Jurisdiction and Related
Problems, 6 VAND. L. REv. 79, 85 (1952).
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judicial standards and remedies." Disputes categorized as political questions
do not meet this standard and are thus excluded from adjudication by the
federal judiciary."
Commentators and jurists have advanced several explanations as to why
a given dispute is classified as a political question." The explanation re-
cently accepted by the Supreme Court is based upon the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers." The doctrine supposedly delineates the respective
spheres of responsibility of each branch of the federal government, and the
political question is without the Court's sphere.'" Notwithstanding the
possible inability to force all prior political question cases into a "separa-
tion of powers" mold," the Court in Baker v. Carr" formulated the most
comprehensive judicial expression of the political question doctrine.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); see 6A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.14 (1968).
"Cases in which the Court has found a political question include: The Kansas Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (involving the rights of Indians to recognition as
a tribe); The Pedro, 175 U.S. 354 (1899); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871) (in-
volving the duration of hostilities); Kennett v. Chambers, 20 U.S. (14 How.) 24 (1852); United
States v. Klintock, 4 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 593 (1820); Rosc v. Himely, 2 U.S. (4 Cranch) 87 (1808)
(involving the recognition of states); It re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890); Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S.
766 (1884) (involving a person's status as a representative of a foreign government); Doe v.
Braden, 21 U.S. (16 How.) 327 (1853) (involving the negotiation of a treaty); Taylor v. Mor-
ton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (No. 13,799) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862);
Ware v. Hylton, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 164 (1796) (involving the violation of a treaty); Terlinden v.
Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Mahoney v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 62 (1870) (involving
the termination of a treaty). See also Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338,
344 (1924).
13Justice Woodbury in his dissenting opinion in Luther v. Borden, 17 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) argued that the determination of political questions are without the jurisdiction of the
Court and their resolution, "belongs to the people and their political representatives, either in the
state or general government." Id. at 19. One commentator has suggested that political questions
remain unresolved because, "where no rules exist the court is powerless to act." Field, The Doctrine
of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485, 511 (1924). However, the
most common explanation is based upon the doctrine of separation of powers. See Coleman v. Mil-
ler, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803); Bear, The Su-
preme Court and the Political Question: Affirmation or Abdication?, 71 W. VA. L. REv. 97
(1969); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REV. 338 (1924); Pugh, The Federal
Declaratory Remedy: justiciability, Jurisdiction and Related Problems, 6 VAND. L. REv. 79
(1952); Tollett, Political Question and the Law, 42 U. DET. L.J. 439 (1965); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. I (1959) ; Weston, Political Questions,
38 HARV. L. REv. 296 (1925); Comment, The Political Question Doctrine and Adam Clayton
Powell, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 320 (1967); Comment, Threat of Enforceisent-Prerequisite of a
Justiciable Controversy, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1962).
14Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962): "[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary
and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government . . . which gives rise to the 'political
question' . . . . The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers."
" See Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 363 (1924).
1"C. POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS 109-23 (1936).
17369 U.S. 186 (1962).
NOTES
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.'"
II. THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE OF THE BAKER FORMULATIONS
Cases involving foreign affairs serve as excellent illustrations of several
of the Baker formulations. Inherent in these cases is a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment to a coordinate political department.'9
But such a commitment has not served as the sole rationale for the relega-
tion of foreign relations to the political question category. Indeed, the
more practical formulations involving the unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made and the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements have operated with as
much, if not more, influence than any "constitutional commitment."'" As
to the possible embarrassment of multifarious pronouncements in the area
of foreign affairs, one jurist has stated, "what an extraordinary anomaly
would such . . . [court] interference present to the world.""
The political question formulation concerning the possible lack of re-
spect due a coordinate branch is very closely related to the formulations in-
volving multifarious pronouncements and constitutional commitments.
Court interference in foreign relations would not only create embarrass-
ment, but would also demonstrate a lack of respect due the coordinate po-
litical departments. In addition, any judicial resolution of issues described
as constitutionally committed to a coordinate branch would certainly evi-
dence lack of respect."
Initial policy determinations of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion
exist in the recognition of the commencement, existence and termination
of hostilities."' The determination by the courts of the duration or condi-
tions of peace or war has consistently evolved from the acts of the polit-
ical departments because "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to say on
what precise day it [war] began or terminated. It is necessary, therefore,
to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government
,,24to fix the dates ....
Cases arising under the Guaranty Clause' also illustrate political ques-
Isid. at 217.
'"Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918): "The conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-
'the political'-departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
"The Rogdai, 278 F. 294, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1920): "The national will must be expressed
through a single political organization; two conflicting 'governments' cannot function at the same
time. By the same token, discordant voices cannot express the sovereign will of the American Na-
tion."
"United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359 (No. 15,971), 361 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
"1In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891), the Court found a constitutional
commitment to the political branches that an enrolled act signed by the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress, and approved by the President was conclusively passed by Congress according
to the forms of the Constitution. The Court then noted: "The respect due coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Id. at 672.
"The Pedro, 175 U.S. 354 (1899); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871).
4 The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 701-02 (1871).
"s U. S. CONST. art. IV, S 4.
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tions requiring such initial policy determinations by the political depart-
ments. In Luther v. Borden"6 the Supreme Court was called upon to decide
which of two opposing governments was the de jure government of Rhode
Island under the Guaranty Clause. Similarly, in Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,27 the issue was whether the state had lost the char-
acteristics of a republican form of government by adoption of the initia-
tive and referendum. The Court in both cases found a constitutional com-
mitment to the political branches." However, the practical effect of a judi-
cial decision heavily influenced the Court. For example, once having found
Rhode Island's charter government in Luther to be a nullity, could the
Court anticipate that relief could be afforded to all those wronged by
such an illegal sovereignty?"5 The answer was provided by Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Taney: "When the decision of this court might lead to such results, it
becomes its duty to examine very carefully its own powers before it under-
takes to exercise jurisdiction."'" Similarly, in Pacific States the confusing
legal consequences of a judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the initiative and referendum, and the awarding of a decree "absolving
from all obligation to contribute to the support of or obey the laws of
such established state government"'" prompted the Court to examine the
justiciability of the issue. Fear of the aftermath, combined with the lack of
judicial criteria for an adequate determination of the characteristics of a
republican form of government,"2 led to the conclusion that the issue de-
manded an initial policy determination which the Court felt was of a
kind for nonjudicial discretion."
Consideration of practical consequences has also motivated the Court in
decisions involving a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stand-
ards for the resolution of the controversy. In Mississippi v. Johnson Mr.
Chief Justice Chase stated, "[s]uppose . . . the injunction prayed for
[is] allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that
the Court is without power to enforce its process."' At least one commen-
2617 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
27223 U.S. 118 (1912).
21 In Luther the Court simply stated that it was the responsibility of Congress to recognize the
lawful government of a state and to determine the means of fulfilling the Guaranty Clause. In
Pacific States the Court reaffirmed this principle by quoting extensively from Luther.
F or, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry . . . and it should be
decided that the charter government had no legal existence during the period of
time above mentioned . . . then the laws passed by its Legislature during that time,
were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its salaries and compensation to its
officers illegally paid; its public accounts improperly settled; and the judgments and
sentences of its courts in civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers who
carried their decisions into operation, answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases
as criminals.
Luther v. Borden, 17 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 6-7 (1849).
so Id. at 7.
"223 U.S. 118, 142 (1912).
"In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Mr. Justice Brennan stated, "[i]n the instance of
nonjusticiability . . . the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether
the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether
protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded." Id. at 198.
33A commentator has suggested: "A careful reading of this opinion [Luther] can leave very
little doubt that the crux of the decision is the unwillingness of the court to enter into the fray."
Finkelstein, judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REv. 338, 343-44 (1923).
3471 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
"5Id. at 500-01.
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tator feels that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia" to refuse to issue an injunction against the further execution of
the laws of Georgia in Cherokee territory was motivated by the rebellious
attitude of the President and the Georgia legislature.'
Thus, the concern for judicial standards extends not only to identifica-
tion of the constitutional duty asserted and the determination of its breach,
but also to the possible protection the Court could effectively offer for any
wrong judicially recognized.
As expounded in Baker the political question formulations are not mere-
ly abstractions, but rather concrete classifications drawn from the under-
lying rationale of prior political question cases. It may be difficult to dif-
ferentiate among the application of some of the formulations in various
situations because their respective areas are overlapping. Nonetheless, their
presence does create the "political question" case.
III. POWELL V. MCCORMACK
Even though Mr. Powell was seated in the 91st Congress, the Supreme
Court reasoned that his $55,000 claim for salary was sufficient to prevent
the controversy from becoming moot. Also, the complaint against the
Sergeant-at-Arms, the Doorkeeper, and the Clerk was held to be sufficient
to warrant the Court's review of the constitutionality of the House resolu-
tion which excluded Mr. Powell. The Court's conclusion that the House's
action was unconstitutional was the result of a detailed historical analysis
which revealed the nonexistence of any constitutional commitment to the
House of Representatives of the power to exclude a member-elect. Un-
fortunately, the Court's discussion was limited, as evidenced by its interpre-
tation of the pre-constitutional precedents, the convention debates, and
the post-ratification proceedings, solely to an analysis of the constitutional
commitment formulation.
The Court concluded that an interpretation of the Constitution was
sufficient to supply "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for
the resolution of the controversy. Indeed, such standards may identify the
duty asserted and determine its breach. But are they sufficient to mold
protection for the right asserted? As Judge Burger, speaking for the
United States court of appeals stated, "When we consider whether the
available 'manageable standards' are adequate for resolving the question
in the sense of solving and settling it, we are forced to conclude that courts
do not possess the requisite means to fashion a meaningful remedy to com-
pel Members of the House to vote to seat Mr. Powell or to compel the
Speaker to administer the oath."' " The petitioners' claims against the mem-
bers of the House were dismissed, and certainly no judicial process what-
ever can compel the Doorkeeper, the Sergeant-at-Arms, or the Clerk to
seat Mr. Powell. None of these officers has the power to make Mr. Powell
330 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
'"C. POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS 112-17 (1936).
"Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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a member of the legislative body that chose to exclude him. 9 Thus arises
the question of whether the Court's declaratory judgment is sufficient in
and of itself to mold protection for Mr. Powell's right to be seated. The
Court's silence implies an affirmative answer, which may be correct. Mr.
Powell was seated in the 91st Congress prior to the decision. This seating
officially ushered the 90th Congress into the annals of history and any de-
cision that Mr. Powell was unconstitutionally excluded from that Con-
gress would not require judicial processes to seat him. Thus, impossibility of
enforcement renders protection of the right asserted unnecessary, and the
"lack of standards" barrier falls away.
The only other Baker formulations seemingly applicable to the contro-
versy concern the "potentiality of multifarious pronouncements" and the
possibility of "lack of respect" arising from a judicial determination. The
Court dismissed these formulations by noting that an alleged conflict re-
sulting from such a decision cannot justify the Court's avoidance of its
constitutional responsibility. But this assertion does not adequately explain
those political question cases" in which alleged conflict has in part moti-
vated the Supreme Court to refuse adjudication of constitutional issues.
Even though in Luther, Pacific States, Johnson, and Cherokee Nation the
Court found a constitutional commitment to the other branches in addi-
tion to alleged conflict engendered by the possibility of "lack of respect"
or "multifarious pronouncements," this difference alone does not seem suf-
ficient to justify a different result in Powell since the Baker formulations
were stated in the alternative.4'
The Supreme Court relied heavily upon its role as constitutional inter-
preter as justification for adjudicating the issues in Powell. This reliance
implies that a constitutional interpretation cannot be avoided even when
the issues present some of the Baker formulations. This is certainly correct
if the resolution of the existence of a constitutional commitment in such
political question cases as Luther, Pacific States, Johnson, and Cherokee
Nation was the result of an interpretation of the Constitution.4 But the
Court in those cases did not delve into pre-convention precedents or the
framers' intentions as was done in Powell. It strongly appears that the
constitutional commitments in those cases resulted from the "lack of
standards," and the possibility of "lack of respect" or "multifarious pro-
nouncements." Thus, the kind of constitutional interpretation that was per-
formed in Powell and professed to be unavoidable by the Court even in the
presence of other Baker formulations, was avoided in prior political ques-
tion cases because of the same formulations.
"The Speaker of the House is the only officer authorized to administer the oath of office and
thus officially seat members-elect. 2 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
40 See notes 26-37 supra, and accompanying text.
41 See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
42 It is sometimes said that the power of the court to declare that a question is without
the scope of its jurisdiction must be derived by interpretation of the Constitution.
As the course of our constitutional law has developed, there does not seem to be any
necessary antithesis between that proposition and the application of the standard
of political wisdom in the decision of cases. Interpretation is a loose word and might
be applied to almost anything.
Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REV. 338, 362 (1923).
NOTES
The Supreme Court claimed that its decision in Powell did not evidence
"lack of respect." Judge Burger believed otherwise when he stated, "[i]t
is difficult to see, . . . that there could be efficient judicial resolution which
was contrary to the action of the House 'without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government.' . . . The issue is ... the nature
of the judicial mandate requested."4 The crucial inquiry in Powell then
was whether the relief requested would require a mandate of a nature
likely to create "lack of respect." It could well be argued that the non-
coercive declaratory judgment requiring seating in a nonexistent Congress
would not promote a direct confrontation with the House.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent notes that the majority in Powell
implicitly recognize their opinion "may be wholly advisory."4 Without
discussing the merits of Mr. Powell's claim for salary, the majority re-
manded the issue to the courts below. Even though it is unlikely that Mr.
Powell has an adequate judicial remedy for his back pay," the very doubt
inherent in the issue should give rise to a court's reluctance to adjudicate
grave and unsettling constitutional questions. The uncertainty of the exist-
ence of any remedy for salary is sufficient to make relief somewhat re-
mote and speculative. Decisions of complex constitutional issues demand
something more than remote and speculative relief," for the Court has
traditionally required "absolute necessity" as a prerequisite to the resolu-
tion of such issues.4 Powell does not pay tribute to this tradition, and it
would seem that the vitality of the principle has suffered serious injury at
the expense of what may well be an advisory opinion.
Even in the event Mr. Powell's salary claim is upheld on remand, the
precedential value of the Court's decision may be severely limited. It could
be difficult to rely upon Powell as precedent in an action contesting a con-
gressional exclusionary proceeding where adjudication would require the
member-elect to be seated in an existing Congress. Political questions con-
cerning "lack of standards" and the possibility of "lack of respect" or
"multifarious pronouncements" were not adequately discussed in Powell.
These formulations may for a future court force such a controversy into
the nonjusticiable political question category when faced with the possi-
bility of forcing the House of Representatives to actually seat a member-
elect.
Raymond L. Dahiberg
"Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" Powell v. McCormack, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969).
' Congressional salaries are payable from the United States Treasury. U.S. CONST. art. I, S
6. A congressman is entitled to his salary only "after he has taken and subscribed the required
oath." 2 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). Mr. Powell never took the oath and hence the Sergeant-at-Arms
cannot pay over his salary without violating 2 U.S.C. § 35. Furthermore, the office of Sergeant-at-
Arms of the 90th Congress has expired. Can the present Sergeant-at-Arms of the 91st Congress
be authorized by a court or by the House of Representatives of the 91st Congress, which is not a
party to the controversy, to make payment to a member-elect of a prior Congress who never took
the oath of office?
" Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962).
47Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905).
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